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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
State v. Hatcher: THE CONTINUED MISUNDERSTANDING
OF THE RECENT SEXUAL ASSAULT COMPLAINT
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
The defendant was charged with forcible rape1 and aggravated
crime against nature.2 In a jury trial, he was found guilty of ag-
gravated crime against nature' and sentenced to serve ten years at
hard labor. The defendant appealed and, as one of fifteen
assignments of error, maintained that the trial judge erred in over-
ruling his objections to certain testimony of the victim's sister on
the grounds that the testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay.
The trial court allowed the victim's sister to relate the details of the
alleged attack as told to her by the victim approximately one-half to
one hour after her arrival home following the occurrence of the
crimes charged. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the
1. Forcible rape is defined as sexual intercourse "without the lawful consent of
the victim because the victim is prevented from resisting the act by force or threats of
physical violence under circumstances where the victim reasonably believes that such
resistance would not prevent the rape." LA. R.S. 14:42.1 (Supp. 1978). The crime is
punishable by imprisonment "for not less than two nor more than forty years." Id. For
an excellent discussion of the constitutionality of mandatory sentences, see Note, Ap-
pellate Review of Sentences, 39 LA. L. REV. 1172 (1979).
2. Crime against nature is defined as "the unnatural carnal copulation by a
human being with another of the same sex or opposite sex or with an animal." LA. R.
S. 14:89 (1950). Aggravated crime against nature is defined as crime against nature
committed under any one or more of the following circumstances:
(1) Where the victim resists the act to the utmost, but such resistance is over-
come by force;
(2) Where the victim is prevented from resisting the act by threats of great
and immediate bodily harm accompanied by apparent power of execution;
(3) Where through idiocy, imbecility or any unsoundness of mind, either tem-
porary or permanent, the victim is incapable of giving consent and the offender
knew or should have known of such incapacity;
(4) Where the victim is incapable of resisting or of understanding the nature of
the act, by reason of stupor or abnormal condition of mind produced by a narcotic
or anesthetic agent, administered by or with the privity of the offender; or when
he has such incapacity, by reason of a stupor or abnormal condition of mind from
any cause, and the offender knew or should have known of such incapacity; or
(5) Where the victim is under the age of seventeen years and the offender is at
least three years older than the victim.
LA. R.S. 14:89.1 (Supp. 1962). While it is not clear from the opinion exactly which pro-
vision the defendant was charged with violating, it was probably either subsection (2)
or (5).
Aggravated crime against nature at the time of the crime was punishable by im-
prisonment at hard labor for not more than fifteen years. Id. A 1979 amendment has
imposed a minimum sentence of three years. 1979 La. Acts, No. 125, amending LA.
R.S. 14:89.1 (Supp. 1962).
3. The jury was unable to agree on a verdict as to the charge of forcible rape.
State v. Hatcher, 372 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (La. 1979) (on original hearing).
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fourteen-year-old victim's description of the occurrence as related to
her sister was properly admitted under the recognized exception to
the hearsay rule allowing admission of the early complaints of rape
victims. State v. Hatcher, 372 So. 2d 1024 (La. 1979) (on original
hearing).
The admissibility of hearsay evidence4 in Louisiana is governed
by Revised Statutes 15:434, which establishes the general rule that
"[h]earsay evidence is inadmissible, unless as otherwise provided in
this Code." Nevertheless, hearsay evidence and many exceptions to
the hearsay rule are not defined in the Louisiana Revised Statutes.'
Consequently, the definition of hearsay and the establishment of ex-
ceptions to the rule are largely a matter of judicial practice and
interpretation .'
The hearsay exception of recent sexual assault complaints has
apparently found favor with the Louisiana courts. However, a
thorough analysis of the Louisiana cases on this subject reveals that
the Louisiana courts' treatment of this topic has not been analytical-
ly consistent with the history of the exception, its admissibility
requirements, and the underlying rationale for its existence.
The origin of admissibility of recent sexual assault complaints
can be traced to the old English law of "hue and cry,"7 according to
which, in all charges of violence, the accuser had to show that "he
made hue and cry, alarming the neighborhood freshly after the oc-
currence."8 Wigmore illustrates the application of this doctrine to
rape charges with the following passage from Bracton:
When therefore a virgin has been so deflowered and over-
powered, against the peace of the lord the king, forthwith and
while the act is fresh she ought to repair with hue and cry to
the neighboring vills and there display to honest men the injury
4. "Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement
made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of
matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-
of-court asserter." C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (Cleary ed. 1972). See also 5
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1361 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
5. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 543-44 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Evidence];
Comment, Excited Utterances and Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 661, 661 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Excited
Utterances]; Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana Criminal
Cases, 14 LA. L. REV. 611, 611 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Hearsay and Non-Hearsay].
. 6. Evidence, supra note 5, at 543-44; Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, supra note 5, at
612.
7. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1135, at 298 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
8. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1760, at 240 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
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done to her, the blood and her dress stained with blood, and the
tearing of her dress; and she ought to go to the provost of the
hundred and to the serjeant of the lord the king and to the cor-
oners and to the viscount and make her appeal to the first
county court.9
Thus, the recent sexual assault complaint was originally admit-
ted merely to satisfy the fresh complaint requirement, and, as
Wigmore explains, it was a "matter of old tradition and practice,
with little or no thought of any principles to support it."'" However,
in the early 1800's the English courts felt a need to explain the
underlying principles of this "inherited and hitherto unquestioned
practice" of admitting this type of evidence." Consequently, there
developed two principles of admissibility: (1) to forestall the in-
ference that unless the prosecutrix complained immediately after
the incident, when it was assumed natural that she would do so, no
outrage had in fact occurred and (2) to corroborate the prosecutrix's
testimony after it has been attacked.12
In England in the early 1800's the recent sexual assault com-
plaint was not a hearsay exception, ie., it was admitted to prove the
fact of complaint and not the truth of the matter asserted.13 The
United States courts originally adopted the same approach;" but, as
early as 1904, some United States courts began to receive the
evidence "testimonially on the case in chief, to prove the facts
asserted,"" either under the exception of res gestae0 or as a spon-
taneous utterance.'7 It was at this point that the recent sexual
assault complaint achieved the status of a hearsay exception, 8 and
today most jurisdictions recognize the exception in this fashion. 9
9. Id., quoting H. DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ANGLIAE, f.147 (ca. 1250).
10. J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1135, at 298.
11. Id.
12. See id., and authorities cited therein. When used for these purposes, the
evidence is considered non-hearsay because the value of the utterances and writings
does not depend on the veracity of the out-of-court asserter. See generally C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 4, at § 249; J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 1766.
13. See note 12, supra.
14. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1761, at 242, and authorities cited therein.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 242-43. For an explanation of the term res gestae, see note 20, infra.
17. J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 1761. For an explanation of the term spon-
taneous utterance, see note 21, infra.
18. J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 1761.
19. Id. at 243 n.2. See, e.g., State v. Finley, 338 P.2d 790 (Ariz. 1959) (statements
made thirty minutes after the incident admissible as res gestae/spontaneous
utterance); State v. Swanson, 228 N.W.2d 101 (Iowa 1975) (the test for admission of
such evidence is spontaneity and such closeness of connection with the transaction as
to preclude any presumption of fabrication; if it meets this test it is admissible as res
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The distinction between the terms "res gestae"2 and "spon-
taneous utterance'"21 is more apparent than real. Originally, res
gestae evidence was defined as words "which accompanied the prin-
ciple [sic] litigated fact."2 Gradually, however, the term was used to
"embody the notion that evidence of any concededly relevant fact or
condition might bring in likewise the words which accompanied it." 3
However, as Wigmore points out, spontaneity is recognized as the
source of special trustworthiness of this type of res gestae
evidence." In recognition of the vague and amorphous nature of the
gestae); State v. Caster, 225 N.W.2d 420 (Neb. 1975) (such evidence to be admissible as
part of the res gestae must be a spontaneous, unpremeditated statement closely con-
nected with the act); State v. Martineau, 324 A.2d 718 (N.H. 1974) (statements of the
victim who was subsequently murdered made two or three hours after the rape ad-
missible because of the continued attempts by defendant's agents to remove the victim
from the bar during this period with threats of violence and exclamations of fear,
based upon a finding that the entire ihcident in the room was a continuation of the ter-
rorizing events the victim hysterically complained of); State v. Wilson, 532 P.2d 825
(Or. App. 1975) (details of the incident uttered up to one hour later admissible as spon-
taneous exclamations due to intervening acts of flight and fear of victim that the at-
tacker was pursuing her).
20. "The exposition of this exception might well be approached with a feeling akin
to despair. There has been such a confounding of ideas, and such a profuse and in-
discriminate use of the shibboleth res gestae, that it is difficult to disentangle the real
basis of the principle involved." J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1745, at 191-92.
As Wigmore points out, the term embodies "two distinct and legitimate principles,
one establishing a real exception to the hearsay rule and the other merely [defining]
those classes of utterances to which the [hearsay] rule is in its nature not applicable."
Id. at 192.
The present discussion is concerned with the hearsay exception of res gestae.
Typically, this type of evidence is a "statement or exclamation by a participant im-
mediately after an injury, declaring the circumstances of the injury, or by a person
present at an affray ... or other exciting occasion, asserting the circumstances of it as
observed by him." Id. § 1746, at 194.
Louisiana defines res gestae evidence in Revised Statutes 15:44748, the texts of
which appear at notes 40-41, infra.
21. "[U]nder certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous
excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their con-
trol, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to
the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock." J.
WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1747, at 195 (emphasis added).
22. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 288, at 686.
23. Id,
24
[Underlying all hearsay exceptions is the principle] that the statement must have
been made under circumstances calculated to give some special trustworthiness to
it, and thus to justify us in exempting it from the ordinary test of cross-
examination on the stand .... This circumstantial guarantee here consists of the
consideration . .. that in the stress of nervous excitement the reflective faculties
may be stilled and the utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expres-
sion of one's actual impressions and belief. The utterance, it is commonly said,
must be "spontaneous."
J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1749, at 199.
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term res gestae, many writers advocate that the term be jettisoned
in favor of other more precise categories, such as "spontaneous
declaration."25 The Federal Rules of Evidence adopt this treatment."'
In any event, in order for the recent sexual assault complaint to
be admissible either under res gestae or under a spontaneous
declaration exception, writers generally agree that certain re-
quirements must be met: (1) there must be an occurrence sufficiently
startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2)
there must be an absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement
must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.
That these requirements are essential becomes obvious when
the rationale for admission of hearsay evidence in general is
examined. There are basically two principles that underlie every
hearsay exception. 8 First, the principle of necessity 9 requires that
25. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 246, at 687 nn. 5-6; J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, §
1745, at 191-92; Excited Utterances, supra note 5, at 663-79.
26. The Federal Rules of Evidence: Symposium, 36 LA. L. REV. 59, 163 (1975).
27. Since the recent sexual assault complaint exception is actually a special form
of the res gestae or spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, J.
WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 1760, it follows, a fortiori, that the complaint to be ad-
missible must meet.the requirements of admissibility of the broad, general class. Id. at
§ 1750.
For a case specifically applying these general requirements to the special form of
the exception, see People v. Damen, 28 Ill. 2d 464, 193 N.E.2d 25 (1963).
28. Wigmore explains:
The theory of the hearsay rule is that many possible sources of inaccuracy and
untrustworthiness which may lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a
witness can best be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of
cross-examination. But this test or security may in a given instance be
superfluous; it may be sufficiently clear, in that instance, that the statement of-
fered is free enough from the risk of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, so that
the test of cross-examination would be a work of supererogation. Moreover, the
test may be impossible of employment-for example, by reason of the death of
the declarant so that, if his testimony is to be used at all, there is a necessity for
taking it in the untested shape.
J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1420, at 251. These two principles then are a circumstan-
tial probability of trustworthiness and necessity for the evidence.
29.
[This principle) implies that since we shall lose the benefit of evidence entirely
unless we accept it untested, there is thus a greater or less necessity for receiv-
ing it. The reason we shall otherwise lose it may be one of two:
(1) The person whose assertion is offered may now be dead, or out of the jurisdic-
tion, or insane, or otherwise unavailable for the purpose of testing [by cross-
examination] ....
(2) The assertion may be such that we cannot expect, again, or at this time, to get
evidence of the same value from the same or other sources. This appears more or
less fully in the exception for spontaneous declarations . . . .Here we are not
threatened (as in the first case) with the entire loss of a person's evidence, but
merely some valuable source of evidence. The necessity is not so great; perhaps
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the evidence be accepted virtually untested in order to prevent the
loss of its benefit. The potential loss of this testimony occurs
primarily in two situations: (1) the asserter may be dead, absent
from the jurisdiction, or otherwise unavailable to testify and (2) the
proferred assertion is such that evidence from the same or another
source will not be as valuable." Secondly, there is the principle that
the evidence possesses a circumstantial degree of trustworthiness
giving it the "probability of accuracy which is substantially
equivalent to the trustworthiness of statements whose accuracy is
tested by cross-examination."'" Consequently, res gestae statements
and spontaneous declarations are viewed as meeting this dual test of
necessity/trustworthiness.2
In light of the history of the recent sexual assault exception, the
requirements of admissibility, and the underlying rationale for ad-
mitting this type of evidence, it appears that the Louisiana Supreme
Court is inconsistent in its approach to the admissibility of certain
complaints of recent sexual assault. In fact, the court seems to con:
sider the first complaint of the victim automatically admissible,
irrespective of the time or conditions under which it was-made. A
study of the Louisiana cases reveals the following: lack of analysis of
the admissibility requirements in regard to the facts of each par-
ticular case, misapplication of the analysis to the facts, confusion of
hearsay evidence with non-hearsay evidence (such as corroborative
evidence), and citation of cases as controlling authority when in fact
the cases do not stand for the cited proposition.
The first Louisiana case to make specific mention of the special
exception to the hearsay rule was State v. Pace." After noting
hardly a necessity, only an expediency or convenience, can be predicated. But the
principle is the same.
Id. § 1422, at 253 (emphasis in original).
30. Id.
31. Id. Wigmore characterizes this second principle as "in the nature of a prac-
ticable substitute for the ordinary test of cross-examination . . . . [Uinder certain cir-
cumstances the probability of accuracy and trustworthiness is practically sufficient, if
not quite equivalent to that of statements tested in the conventional manner." Id.
He also states that there is "ample authority in judicial utterances for naming" as
one of three classes one "where the circumstances are such that a sincere and accurate
statement would naturally be uttered, and no plan of falsification be formed." Id. at
254. It is into this class that the recent sexual assault complaint falls. See text at note
27, supra.
32. J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at § 1423.
33. 301 So. 2d 323 (La. 1974). In 1962, the defendant was convicted of attemped ag-
gravated rape in violation of Revised Statutes 14:27 and 14:42. As a multiple offender
he was sentenced to forty years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. At the sentencing
hearing the defendant's counsel gave notice of his. intention to appeal; the appeal was
never perfected. In 1972 the defendant was granted an out-of-time appeal in a habeas
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writings and jurisprudence from other jurisdictions and recognizing
the trend to extend rather than narrow the scope of the introduc-
tion of evidence as res gestae, the court held that the testimony of
the mother of the six-year-old victim regarding the complaint made
by the child "the same day as the offense" was "sufficiently related
to the offense to form part of the res gestae."4 The court found that
the statements were the product of a "shocking episode" and that
the time interval was not indicative of fabrication. 5 The approach
taken by the court is entirely consistent with the requisites of ad-
missibility of this type of evidence, 6 and the sanctioning of the use
of the evidence as a hearsay exception is analytically sound.
In a subsequent case, State v. Brown, 7 the court's analytical
treatment of the recent sexual complaint evidence began to
deteriorate. The court admitted the testimony of the sixteen-year-
old victim's mother concerning the account of the attack made to
her by the victim, finding that the "complaint was sufficiently
related to the offense to form part of the res gestae. ' 8 Due to the
circumstances of the case, however, the admissibility of the
testimony as res gestae is questionable. The girl returned home
"less than an hour" after the incident, wearing clothes different
from those that she had worn to school that morning. She then
"broke down" under the mother's questioning and told her of the
rape, explaining her silence by saying that her life had been
threatened and that her attackers had warned her not to say
anything about the incident.39 Based upon a reading of the codal
definition of res gestae found in Revised Statutes 15:4474' and
corpus proceeding. He objected to testimony of the victim's mother in which she was
allowed. to state that her six-year-old daughter returned home from babysitting crying.
When questioned by the mother, the child stated that the defendant molested her.
34. 301 So. 2d at 326.
35. Id.
36. See text at note 27, supra. It must be noted that the child's age is an impor-
tant factor in considering the admissibility of this type of evidence as res gestae
evidence. Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1368, 1378 (1962).
37. 302 So. 2d 290 (La. 1974). The defendant was convicted of aggravated rape in
violation of Revised Statutes 14:42 and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal
the defendant did not perfect a bill of exceptions; the court reviewed the record for er-
rors patent on its face and, finding none, affirmed the conviction. However, in a subse-
quent habeas corpus proceeding, the United States district court ordered an out-of-
time appeal.
38. 302 So. 2d at 293.
39. Id.
40. LA. R.S. 15:447 (1950) reads:
Res gestae are events speaking for themselves under the immediate pressures
of the occurrence, through the instructive, impulsive and spontaneous words and
acts of the participants, and not the words of the participants when narrating the
events. What forms any part of the res gestae is always admissible in evidence.
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15:448,"' it is evident that the statements concerning the attack
clearly did not constitute res gestae, as they were not "necessary in-
cidents of the criminal act" or "immediate concomitants of it," nor
did they "form in conjunction with it one continuous transaction." 2
Also analytically troubling is the case of State v. Noble,'3 involv-
ing the brutal rape of a four-year-old child. The court upheld the ad-
missibility of the testimony of the victim's grandmother regarding
the child's first complaint, which occurred two days after the attack
when the victim was in the hospital. To explain the considerable
laspe of time between the attack and the first complaint, the court
found that it was the first opportunity the child had to discuss the
crime "with a person whom she loved and trusted outside the at-
mosphere of her home where the accused had been living with her
mother for several months."" The grandmother's testimony,
however, was restricted to the "nature of the crime and the identity
of the offender."4 The court specifically rejected admitting the
testimony as res gestae and allowed it as a "product of the shocking
episode,"4'6 relying on similar language used in Pace. But the reliance
was misplaced, because the court in Pace did admit the evidence as
res gestae. It is suggested that, since the definition of hearsay and
the hearsay exceptions are largely a matter of judicial discretion
and interpretation, the court, in determining the admissibility of the
evidence, should have conducted a necessity/trustworthiness 47 in-
quiry, i.e., when the court is unable to find an appropriate
"pigeonhole exception" for the evidence, if it is reliable and the cir-
cumstances necessitous, the court may admit it.
The court again indicated its willingness to admit hearsay
testimony concerning the first complaint of rape without a sound
analytical basis in State v. Elzie.8 Appearing at the witness's house
41. LA. R.S. 15:448 (1950) reads: "To constitute res gestae the circumstances and
declarations must be necessary incidents of the criminal act, or immediate con-
comitants of it, or form in conjunction with it one continuous transaction."
42. LA. R.S. 15:448 (1950).
43. 342 So. 2d 170 (La. 1977). Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape in viola-
tion of Revised Statutes 14:42 and sentenced to death. The court reviewed the convic-
tion on direct appeal.
44. 342 So. 2d at 173.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See notes 28-32, supra, and accompanying text.
48. 351 So. 2d 1174 (La. 1977). The defendant was convicted of attempted ag-
gravated rape and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment at hard labor. The court
reviewed the conviction on direct appeal. The testimony objected to consisted of the,
following:
And I kept asking her what was wrong. And she said, nothing, at first. And I just
kept asking her. And she said: May I use your telephone? And I said: Well, what's
1980] 1043
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crying, the victim asked to use the phone and, at this time, iden-
tified the perpetrator of the rape; the witness was allowed to testify
as to this identification. While there was in fact "no unexplained
lapse of time between the rape and the victim's complaint," since it
occurred immediately after the incident, 9 the court cited Brown and
State v. Hills50 as authority for invoking the recent sexual assault
complaint exception. As noted previously, the Brown court admitted
the testimony as res gestae and the correctness of the result in that
case is questionable.51 The reliance on Hills is totally misplaced in
that the Hills court admitted the testimony as corroboration or non-
hearsay res gestae evidence. 2 Furthermore, the stated purpose of
the evidence was to show that "an outcry was immediately made
after the rape and to corroborate the testimony of the prosecuting
witness as to her physical appearance and condition."" There is no
discussion in Hills concerning the special exception, and quoting
State v. Labat," the court admitted the evidence, "not as proof of
wrong, [name of victim]. And then she told me. She said: Robert raped me. And I
said-and I said: Well, yeah use the phone. So, she called her husband and the
police.
Id. at 1175. After the incident, the victim dressed and walked to the witness's house to
use the phone, as the victim did not have one of her own. She arrived at the witness's
home "a very few minutes" after the rape occurred, frightened and hysterical. Id. at
1176.
49. See text at note 27, supra.
50. 241 La. 345, 129 So. 2d 12 (1961). The defendant was convicted of aggravated
rape in violation of Revised Statutes 14:42, and sentenced to death. The court re-
viewed the conviction on direct appeal.
51. See text at notes 37-42, supra.
52. In Hills, the victim's landlord was allowed to testify that he heard a banging
at the door and that when he opened it he saw that the victim was in an hysterical and
scarcely audible condition. He testified that her mouth was "busted" and bleeding and
her clothing disarranged and dirty. After about five minutes she calmed down and told
him she had just been raped. Furthermore, he testified that she described her
assailant and said that she would recognize him by his walk, his talk, and his face and
that she would remember her attacker for the rest of her life. 241 La. at 353, 129 So.
2d at 20.
The court admitted the evidence to corroborate the testimony of the victim regard-
ing the incidents and events of the rape and the identity of her assailant. By definition,
this is a non-hearsay use of the testimony, i.e., it is offered not as proof of the truth of
the statement made..
53. Id. at 356, 129 So. 2d at 20.
54. 226 La. 201, 75 So. 2d 333 (1954). In this case, defendants Labat and Poret
were convicted of aggravated rape in violation of Revised Statutes 14:42 and sentenced
to death. The court reviewed the conviction on direct appeal. The victim's companion
and a police officer who arrived on the scene shortly after the incident were allowed to
testify regarding the victim's statements immediately after the incident. The compan-
ion testified: "She said it was terrible, that's all I remember her saying." 226 La. at
219, 75 So. 2d at 340. One police officer testified the victim said that "[sihe had been at-
tacked in an alleyway taken there by two Negroes." Id. at 220, 75 So. 2d at 340.
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the truth of the statement made but as part of the res gestae. 55
Thus, the evidence was not denominated as hearsay in Hills, and,
therefore, that case offers no authority in deciding the admissibility
of hearsay evidence.56
As the foregoing analysis indicates, the Louisiana Supreme
Court, with the notable exception of Pace, has not conducted the
relevant inquiry into how the facts of each case relate to the ad-
missibility requirements for the recent sexual assault complaint ex-
ception. Instead, the court appears to be viewing the victim's first
complaint and details of the incident as automatically admissible
under the rubric of res gestae or spontaneous utterance, regardless
of the particular circumstances. In addition, the court is failing to
distinguish between hearsay and non-hearsay use of this type of
evidence.
State v. Hatcher57 is yet another indication that the Louisiana
Supreme Court is continuing its practice of approaching the ad-
missibility of early complaints of rape victims without attention to
its history, its admissibililty requirements, and the underlying ra-
tionale for its existence. In that case, the record indicates that the
victim was walking home from school when the defendant ap-
proached her and asked her name and age. Pretending to be a talent
scout, he asked if she was interested in being in the movies. Ex-
pressing interest, the victim got into the defendant's car, and he
transported her to his aunt's house. The defendant produced a job
application and instructed the victim to falsify her age; although he
knew she was only fourteen, he told her to say that she was twenty.
She was told to remove her clothes, and in the face of threats from
the defendant, she did as she was told. After taking nude
55. Id. at 221, 75 So. 2d at 340.
56. In Elzie the court specifically stated: "The statement of which defendant com-
plains is certainly hearsay because it is the out-of-court, unsworn statement of a third
person offered for the truth of its content." 351 So. 2d at 1175 (emphasis added).
However, as discussed in notes 52 & 54, supra, both Hills and Labat admitted the
evidence as non-hearsay res gestae evidence and specifically ruled against the evidence
being admitted for its truth value.
In State v. McCloud, 357 So. 2d 1132 (La. 1978), the court applied the same faulty
reasoning as in Elzie. The defendant in McCloud, charged with aggravated rape, was
convicted of forcible rape and sentenced to thirty years at hard labor. The court
reviewed the conviction on direct appeal. The victim's mother was allowed to testify
that less than twenty minutes after the incident, the victim, who was upset and ner-
vous, told her she had been raped. The court, citing Elzie, held that the statement was
properly admitted as it was made under pressure of the rape soon after its occurrence.
Hence, since ELie held the testimony admissible under a hearsay exception,
presumably, although not stated, the evidence in this case was also considered admissi-
ble under a hearsay exception.
57. 372 So. 2d 1024 (La. 1979) (on original hearing)..
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photographs of the victim, the defendant raped her and forced her
to perform an act of fellatio upon him. He accomplished these acts
by threatening the victim with physical violence if she did not com-
ply. After the incident, the victim rode a bus home. After her ar-
rival, she bathed and then lay down for a short period of time.
Although noticeably upset, the victim failed to respond to her
mother's questioning. She then went to her sister's house, arriving
crying and upset. The victim then related the details of the incident
to her sister. Choosing as the relevant time frame the elapsed time
from the victim's arrival home until the time the statements
concerning the attack were made, the court held that the complaint
of the fourteen-year-old victim of sex offenses to her sister "was
spontaneous and made under the immediate pressure of the occur-
rence."
58
There was no consideration by the court of how much time
elapsed from the occurrence of the incident until the victim made
her complaint. It is submitted that this is the relevant time frame
rather than the time between the victim's arrival home by bus from
the scene of the incident and the time the statements were made.
Thus, the elapsed time from the incident to the victim's arrival
home must be added to the "one-half to one hour" elapsed time from
the arrival home to the statements. In order to be analytically con-
sistent with Pace, the court should have excluded the proferred
evidence.
The evidence admitted failed two of the three tests for ad-
missibility of complaints of recent sexual assault.59 The statements
made by the victim to her sister were not spontaneous and unreflec-
ting, and the elapsed time of well over one-half to one hour from the
incident presents ample opportunity for fabrication. It is not sug-
gested that the victim was less than truthful in her statements to
her sister; rather, it is the apparent rubber stamp admissibility that
is objectionable.
If the supreme court continues its current policy of sanctioning
this type of evidence without any meaningful analysis of the purpose
of the exception, and this lack of analysis is accompanied by a con-
comitant lack of inquiry into the necessity/trustworthiness of the
testimony, substantial violations of a defendant's constitutional right
of confrontation could result.0 In Hatcher, the evidence against the
58. Id. at 1031.
59. See text at note 27, supra.
60. The right to confront and cross-examine one's accusers is embodied in the
sixth amendment, which provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right .. .to be confronted with the Witnesses against him."
"[Tjhe Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him
1046 [Vol. 40
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defendant was overwhelming, 1 and any harm done by the objec-
tionable evidence was probably minimal. But one can imagine a
.. . is a fundamental right .. .made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). As the Court in Pointer ex-
plained:
There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this court and other courts have
been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of
confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement
for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal. Indeed, we
have expressly declared that to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine
the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of due process of law.
Id. at 405 (citations omitted). In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the
Supreme Court held that an accused's right of confrontation secured by the sixth
amendment is violated by the introduction at a joint trial of a confession by the
codefendant inculpating the accused where the codefendant does not testify. The viola-
tion occurs notwithstanding jury instructions that the codefendant's confession must
be disregarded in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. The objection is
that the confession of the codefendant is inadmissible hearsay, and without the
codefendant's testimony, the bare, untested assertion is not subjected to cross-
examination in order to reveal many possible deficiencies and sources of error and un-
trustworthiness. However, not every violation of the Bruton doctrine will result in a
reversal; "[a] defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Id. at 135. In many
cases a jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard the 'informa-
tion.
Bruton did not limit its discussion to just a confession by the codefendant but rather
spoke in broader terms of inadmissible "hearsay." Since it is into this category that
the recent sexual assault complaint falls when the admissibility requirements are not
strictly adhered to, the argument of deprivation of the accused's sixth amendment
rights has force. If the statement by the victim, who does not testify at trial concern-
ing the details of the attack, is the only direct evidence against the accused, this
writer believes that a conviction would be obtained in denial of the accused's right to a
fair trial.
61. After the victim of the alleged crimes testified, three teenage victims of prior
forcible rapes or aggravated crimes against nature allegedly committed by the defen-
dant also testified. Their testimony regarding their experiences was essentially the
same as that of the victim in the instant case. See text at note 58, supra. The court on
rehearing sanctioned the use of this evidence presented by the victim of other sex
crimes as it met the several tests for admissibility. These tests are:
(1) there must be clear and convincing evidence of the commission of the other
crimes and the defendant's connection therewith;
(2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the
uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say
they are the work of the same person;
(3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other pur-
pose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime-on trial
because he is a man of criminal character;
(4) the other crimes evidence must tend to prove a material fact genuinely at
issue;
(5) the probative value of the extraneous crimes evidence must outweigh its pre-
judicial effect.
372 So. 2d at 1033 (on rehearing) (citations omitted).
It is important to note, as the court did, that in a prosecution for rape in which the
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hypothetical case in which the only evidence amassed against the
defendant is circumstantial 2 and the victim is unavailable to testify
and, in fact, has never made a sworn statement on record. To allow
a witness to testify as to what the absent victim told him, as much
as several hours after the incident concerning the details of the at-
tack, would be tantamount to trial of the defendant without fur-
nishing him his constitutionally guaranteed right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers. It is certainly not suggested that the
supreme court would knowingly sanction such an obvious travesty
of justice; however, it is submitted that to continue the sanctioning
of the type of evidence offered in the Hatcher case without any
meaningful inquiry into its necessity and trustworthiness is to set
the stage for this hypothetical travesty of justice to become a reali-
ty.
Estelle Mahoney
GULF STATES UTILITIES, THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, AND THE SUPREME COURT: ON
RAISING THE ELECTRIC RATES
The Louisiana Public Service Commission denied a request by
Gulf States Utilities for an increase in its electric rates.' On appeal
from a district court judgment which had generally upheld the
Commission's denial,2 the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the
only issue is the consent of the victim of that rape evidence of other offenses is usually
inadmissible. Id. at 1034 n.1. The defendant was not convicted of the forcible rape
charge or of a lesser included offense, however, and the court viewed any prejudice
that the defendant might have suffered in his defense to that prosecution as "inconse-
quential." Id. at 1034.
62. For a thorough discussion of circumstantial evidence (i.e., all offered eviden-
tiary facts not being assertions from which the truth of the matter asserted is desired
to be inferred) as distinguished from testimonial evidence, see 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 25 (3d ed. 1940). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at § 185.
1. Gulf States Utils. Co., 20 P.U.R. 4th 147 (La. P.S.C. 1977). The increase in
rates would have produced additional revenues of $23,750,000.
2. The district court had, however, granted an attrition adjustment. Attrition is
the tendency of a utility's rate of return to diminish because of rising expenses due to
inflation. Central Main Power Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 382 A.2d 302, 316 n.18 (Me.
1978). For a discussion of rate of return, see text at notes 3-7, infra. Utilities typically
present their rate requests to regulatory agencies using their most recent figures for
expenses, revenues, and valuation. See, e.g., New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Util., 354 N.E.2d 860, 865 (Mass. 1976). When the matter is finally con-
cluded a year or two later, the rate relief granted will inevitably produce a smaller
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